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PROTECTING THE PROTECTORS: PREVENTING THE DECLINE OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Michael F. Cosgrove*

"By its approachand action in this matter... the (Inter-American)

Commission is frustratingthe general will of the people of Trinidad
and Tobago, who have clearly given their government a mandate to
deal with crimes generally, but specifically, with the escalatinglevel
of murders in the country."
- George Dhanny, InternationalLawyer'
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INTRODUCTION
International human rights enforcement mechanisms depend upon the
support of nation-states.2 Any human rights system "is only as strong as its
members. Its effectiveness will be significantly reduced if countries pull out
whenever they perceive the [system] as posing an obstacle to domestic
practice."3 The Inter-American system for human rights protection once
occupied a strong position in regional human rights protection. However,
the strength of the system has begun fading since it turned its attention from
2 See Natalia Schiffrin, Current Development, Jamaica Withdraws the Right of
IndividualPetition Under the InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, 92
AM. J.INT'LL. 563, 568 (1998).
3 Id. at 568. Cf. Jo M. Pasqualucci, Provisional Measures in the Inter-American
Human Rights System: An Innovative Development in InternationalLaw, 26 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 803, 846 (1993) (mentioning the importance of the political cost of noncompliance with decisions of human rights institutions).
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country reports to individual petitions. Procedural delay in the individual
petition process is weakening the system's support among countries whose
application of the death penalty is undermined by this delay. The
weakening of the support is manifesting itself in the withdrawal of some
States from the system. The system must respond to concerns over delays in
death penalty cases in order to maintain or increase its effectiveness in
protecting human rights.
Part I of this Note describes the operation of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights. Part II analyzes the problem of backlog and delay in the system.
Part III discusses the negative impact of delay on the application of the
death penalty and illuminates the conflict between the Court and the
Commission on one hand and States attempting to address the "death row
phenomenon" on the other. Part IV evaluates the status quo and currently
available options for reform. This Note argues in favor of an alternative
"fast track' procedure for death penalty-related petitions. The fast track
procedure will reduce delay and eliminate the conflict between the system's
institutions and the States concerned. The resolution of this conflict will
help to retain members and thus strengthen the human rights regime for the
Americas.
I. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN

RIGHTS

The Inter-American system for human rights protection is a creation of
the Organization of American States (OAS). In addition to Member States
of the OAS, the system consists of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (the "Commission") and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (the "Court"). Part A discusses the creation and procedures
of the Commission. Part B discusses the development and operation of the
Court.
A.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Rising to
the Challenge
1. The Development and Strengthening of the Commission
As a result of the evolution of the system, the Commission operates
within two distinct spheres. Upon its creation in 1959, the Commission was
given the responsibility of promoting respect for human rights.4 The
Commission initially promoted human rights by reporting on the human
rights situation in the Member States of the OAS and making

See INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TEN YEARS
1971-1981, at 5 (1982) [hereinafter TEN YEARS OF ACTIvITIES].
4

OF ACTIVITIES:
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recommendations for promoting human rights to the Member States. 5 In
1965, the Commission was empowered to receive individual
communications and to recommend remedies to Member States concerning
those petitions.6 Subsequently, the Commission became an organ of the
OAS, thus securing its place within the regional system. 7 In 1978, the
American Convention on Human Rights (the Convention or the American
Convention) entered into force and the Commission became an organ of the
Convention. 8 Thus, the Commission has a dual role in the Inter-American
human rights system.9 First, as an organ of the OAS, the Commission may
conduct investigations of and receive petitions from citizens of any Member
State of the OAS.' 0 Second, the Commission has independent jurisdiction
over the States Parties to the American Convention." In contrast, the Court,
discussed below, has jurisdiction only over States Parties to the Convention
that have specifically acceded to the Court's contentious jurisdiction. 12 This
Note focuses on the Convention-based system. 13

5
6

See SCOTT DAVIDSON, THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 14 (1992).
See id. at 15.

7 See id.
8

See id. at 18-19.

9 See Cecilia Medina, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Reflections on a Joint Venture, 12 HuM. RTs. Q.
439, 440-48 (1990).
10 See TEN YEARS OF ACTIVITIES, supra note 4, at 8-9. Within this sphere of
competence, the Commission applies the American Declaration of Human Rights to
produce nonbinding recommendations in a manner similar to that outlined under the
Convention-based system discussed in this Note. See id.
" See id.
12

See DAVIDSON, supra note 5, at 2.

13 See Figure 1, infra, for the membership of the system.
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Ratified and
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Tobago
Uruguay
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3aint Vincent and
the Grenadines
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Nevis

FIGURE 1: STATUS OF THE AMERICAN CONVENTION
Source: The Inter-American System of Human Rights 562-3 (David J. Harris & Stephen
Livingstone eds., 1998).

The Commission is composed of seven members who are "persons of
high moral character and recognized competence in the field of human
rights."'14 The General Assembly elects Commission members in their
personal capacity for a four-year term, and these members may only be
reelected once.1 The Commission meets for eight weeks each year and
14

American Convention on Human Rights, art. 34, reprinted in BASIC

PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, at 38
American Convention].
15

See id. art. 37.

DOCUMENTS

(1992) [hereinafter
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determines the number of regular sessions at its discretion during these
eight weeks. 16 The Chairman of the Commission or an absolute majority of
the Commission's members may convoke special sessions when
necessary. 17 The General Secretary of the OAS appoints the Commission's
secretariat. 18
The Commission has at its disposal two primary tools. The first, the
individual petition process, is discussed in detail below. The second tool is
the country report. Country reports detail the status of human rights in a
particular country and examine a government's conduct concerning human
rights in general.' 9 Utilization of this tool has decreased proportionately to
the Commission's increasing reliance on individual petitions.
Country reports carry with them many benefits. First, the Commission
may initiate investigations at its own discretion.2' Second, information may
be gathered from any source. 2 Third, the procedure is short and flexible.
Fourth, the Commission issues recommendations promptly and sets a
deadline for government compliance.24 Fifth, the Commission may conduct
an observation in loco with the consent of the government.2 Sixth, the
reports allow the Commission to make greater use of publicity. 26 These
benefits make country reports an effective tool for pressuring national
leaders to end human rights abuses. 27
Despite these benefits, the "process of on-site investigations and
issuing specific country reports on the mission's findings has now virtually
disappeared" because of a lack of resources and the focus on individual
16

See Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 15,

reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM, supra note 14, at 108 [hereinafter Regulations of the Commission].
17 See id.
18 See American Convention, supra note 14, art. 40.
19 See CECILIA MEDINA

QUIROGA,

THE

BATTLE

OF

HUMAN

RIGHTS:

SYSTEMATIC VIOLATIONS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 152 (1988).
20 See Tom Farer, The Rise of the Inter-AmericanHuman Rights Regime:

a Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox, 19 HuM. RTS.

GROSS,

No Longer

Q. 510, 544 (1997).

21

See QUIROGA, supra note 19, at 320.

22

See id.

23 See id.
24

See id. at 321.

25 See id.
26

See id.

27

For example, former Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza cited the 1978 report

on the status of human rights in Nicaragua "as one of the decisive forces driving him to
resign and flee the country even though the Guard was still holding the line in most of
the country." Farer, supra note 20, at 538.
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petitions.28 A renewed use of country reports (or thematic reports, as
suggested by a former Commission President), while lacking an immediate
benefit to any particular petitioner, could improve overall respect for human
rights in the Americas. 29
2. The Lengthy Individual Petition Procedures of the Commission
The American Convention also allows individual victims direct access
to the Commission. Under the Convention, any person, group of persons, or
nongovernmental organization recognized in at least one Member State of
the OAS may file a petition with the Commission.30 As will become evident
below, the petition process can be long and cumbersome.
Upon receiving a petition, the Commission must first determine its
admissibility. The primary requirement for admissibility is the exhaustion
of domestic remedies. 31 There are several exceptions to this requirement.
The petitioner need not exhaust domestic remedies if domestic law does not
afford due process, if he was prevented from exhausting domestic remedies,
or if there is an unwarranted delay in rendering final judgment.3 2
Additionally, a remedy that is not adequate in a particular case need not be
exhausted. s A petitioner need not exhaust domestic remedies if he is
unable to do so because of indigence or generalized fear in the legal
community. 34
In addition to exhausting domestic remedies, the petition must meet
four other requirements of admissibility. First, the petition must be lodged
within six months of the petitioner's notification of final judgment.3 5
Second, the subject of the petition cannot be pending in another
28 Jos6 Miguel Vivanco, InternationalHuman Rights Litigation in Latin America:
The OAS Human Rights System, in COLLECTIVE RESPONSES TO REGIONAL PROBLEMS: THE
CASE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 73, 79 (Carl Kaysen et al. eds., 1994).
29 See Farer, supra note 20, at 544-45.

30 See American Convention, supra note 14, art. 44. In contrast to the European
system, which requires specific recognition by States before the Commission can accept
individual petitions but does not require such recognition for interstate communications,
in the Inter-American system states must recognize the Commission's competence to
receive interstate complaints, but a similar recognition is not required for the
Commission to accept individual communications. See id. arts. 44-45.
31 See id. art. 46(1)(a).
32

See id. art. 46(2)(a)-(c).

See Veldsquez Rodriguez Case (Judgment of July 29, 1988), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 4, at para. 64 (1988).
33

34 See I/A Court H.R., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies
(American Convention on Human Rights, Arts. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 42 (2)(b)), Advisory
Opinion OC-11/90 of Aug. 10, 1990. Series ANo. 11, at 21.

35 See American Convention, supra note 14, art. 46(1)(b).
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international proceeding.36 Third, the petition must contain certain
information identifying the petitioner or his legal representative. 37 Fourth,
the petition must state facts that, if true, would tend to establish a violation
of rights under the American Convention. 38The Commission is not required
of admissibility unless the
to make a formal or express determination
39
government contests admissibility.
If the petition is admissible, 4° the investigation process begins. The
Commission provides the State with information in the petition (although
no information pertaining to the identity of the petitioner is released) and
requests information from the State.4 1 The government has ninety days to
provide the information, but may request a thirty-day extension. 42 The
government may not be given more than 180 days from the date of the
Commission's communication, however. 43 If the government fails to
respond within the 180-day period, the Commission may assume the truth
of the facts submitted to the State. 44 After the government response (or lack
thereof), the replies and accompanying documents are then made known to
the petitioner, who is given thirty days to submit observations and contrary
evidence. 45 The government then has another thirty days to make its final
observations. 46 Thus, theoretically the initial processing of a petition should
take a maximum of 240 calendar days.
The Commission examines the case at its next session either after the
government fails to respond to the original communication, after the
petitioner's response time or the government's final response time has
elapsed without a response, or after the government's final response. 47 The
Commission may hold a hearing and request oral and written statements
and any other pertinent information from the parties.48 If necessary, the
36

See id. art. 46(1)(c).

37 See id. art. 46(1)(d).
38 See id. art. 47(b).
39 See Velisquez Rodriguez Case (Preliminary Objections) (Judgment of June 26,

1987), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 1, at para. 40 (1987); Jo M. Pasqualucci, The
Inter-American Human Rights System: EstablishingPrecedents andProcedurein Human
Rights Law, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 297, 340 (1994-95).
40 Most petitions make it through "the Commission's deliberately porous
jurisdictional screen" and then are "immediately stalled." Farer, supra note 20, at 528.
41 See Regulations of the Commission, supra note 16, at art. 34(1)(c).
42 See id. art. 34(5) and (6).
43 See id. art. 34(6).
44 See id. art. 42.
45 See id. art. 34(7).
46 See id. art. 34(8).
47 See id. art. 36.
48

See id. art. 43
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Commission may conduct an on-site investigation within the respondent
country's territory.49 At any time during this process, the Commission may
work with the parties to achieve a friendly settlement of the dispute, either
at the request of the parties or on its own initiative. The Commission need
not pursue friendly settlement at its own initiative if it determines it to be
unsuitable or unnecessary. 0 Once the investigation is completed, the
Commission has 180 days to prepare its decision. 1
If there is no friendly settlement, the Commission prepares a report,
along ewith its proposals
and recommendations, and transmits the report to
52
the government. The government may choose to settle the matter or
request reconsideration once within a ninety-day deadline if it invokes new
facts or legal arguments. s Alternatively, the Commission or the
government may transmit the case to the Court within three months of
transmitting the report to the government. 54 If the case is not forwarded to
the Court and the government does not settle the matter, the Commission
prepares a second report. This report contains the Commission's opinion
and conclusions, as reached by a vote of an absolute majority of the
Commission's members. 55 In making recommendations, the Commission
may prescribe a period in which the government must adopt the measures. 6
transmits the report to the parties, but it may not be
The Commission
57
published.
After the period set by the Commission for the government to adopt
the recommendations in the second report expires, the Commission
determines whether the State has fulfilled its obligation and whether to
publish the report.58 Additionally, the report may be submitted to the
41 See id. art. 44.

"0 See American Convention, supra note 14, art. 48(1)(e); Regulations of the
Commission, supra note 16, art. 45(7); Pasqualucci, supra note 39, at 340-41. See
generally Charles Moyer, Friendly Settlement in the Inter-American System: The
Verbitsky Case - When Push Needn't Come to Shove, in LA CORTE Y EL SISTEMA
INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 347 (Rafael Nieto Navia ed., 1994)

(discussing a specific instance of the friendly-settlement procedure); David Padilla, The
Inter-AmericanCommission on Human Rights of the OrganizationofAmerican States:A

Case Study, 9 AM. J. INT'LL. & POL'Y 95, 106-08 (1993) (discussing the increasing use
of friendly settlement procedures).
51 See Regulations of the Commission, supra note 16, art. 44(3).
52 See id. art. 47.

See id. art. 54.
54 See id. art. 47(2).
55 See id.
53

56

See id. art. 47(3).

57 See id. art. 47(6).
18

See id. art. 48(1).
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General Assembly of the OAS as part of the Commission's Annual
Report. 59 As stated above, if the Member State involved has acceded to the
contentious jurisdiction of the Court, the Commission may refer
the case to
60
the Court after it transmits the initial report to the government.
The foregoing process, although complex and time-consuming in
itself, is further drawn out by the practical operation of the process. The
Commission has often treated its individual petition procedure with
flexibility. Before the American Convention entered into force, the
Commission would send a letter incorporating the allegations to the Foreign
Minister of the respondent State. 61 After time passed and the Commission
prodded the government, the government would respond in a predictable
manner, celebrating the country's commitment to human rights in the first
paragraph, praising the Commission in the second paragraph, and denying
the charges or stating that the charges were being inquired into in the final
paragraph. 62 If the government was still investigating the charges, the
Commission would prod more, resulting in a more or less identical letter,
but with the third paragraph stating that the investigation had revealed the
accusation to have no basis.63 The petitioner might cut in to provide new
information, and the Commission and the government would resume their
dance. 64 Occasionally, the Commission would allow petitioners and the
governments to argue their cases ex parte, without any rules of evidence or
procedure being followed and no record being kept.65 Eventually (long after
the six months the government was provided with to come forth with
information), the Commission would "accept the allegations as 66
true and
include the case in its annual report to the OAS General Assembly.,
This process is not prompt; however, the flexibility "gives the States
the opportunity to rectify the anomalous situations that have occasioned the
complaints." 67 Because the Commission's reports are not legally binding,
the Commission must be able to negotiate flexibly with governments in
order to secure compliance. The Commission was created as a quasidiplomatic body and retains diplomatic qualities despite the growth of its

59 See id.

art. 48(2).

60

See id. art. 50(1).

61

See Farer, supra note 20, at 528.

62

See id. at 528-29.
See id. at 529.
See id.
See id. at 543.

63

64
65

66 Id. at 529.
67

Lynda E. Frost, The Evolution of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights:

Reflections of Present and FormerJudges, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 171, 180 (1992).
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quasi-judicial functions.68 Its diplomatic nature necessitates a flexible
procedure that allows for fluid discussion between the parties. 69 The
American Convention did not initially change the Commission's informal
handling of cases. However, pressure from human rights lawyers and the
Court has prompted a somewhat more case-oriented approach.70
B.
The Inter-American Court on Human Rights: Strengthening
the System's Effectiveness
1. The Origin and Structure of the Court
The Court is a relative newcomer to the Inter-American system. The
Court came into being in May 1979, one year after the American
Convention entered into force. 71 The Court is composed of seven judges,
who may be nationals of any OAS Member State. Judges are elected only
by the States Parties to the American Convention for a six-year term.72 The

Court meets on a part-time basis, twice a year for several weeks per
73 However, judges must remain at the Court's disposal at all
session.
74
times.

The Court has two forms of jurisdiction: Advisory jurisdiction and
contentious (adjudicatory) jurisdiction. Under its advisory jurisdiction, the
Member States and organs of the OAS may consult the Court on issues
related to the interpretation of the American Convention and other treaties
"concerning the protection of human rights in the American States,"
allowing the Court to render a non-binding decision concerning the issue. 75
63 See Ver6nica G6mez, The InteractionBetween the PoliticalActors of the OAS, the
Commission and the Court, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 173,209
(David J. Harris & Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998).
69 Cf. Frost, supra note 67, at 179 (quoting Judge Tovar of Venezuela discussing the

fact that the Commission is more political than jurisdictional and is accustomed to acting
alone); Juan E. Mdndez & Jos6 Miguel Vivanco, Disappearancesand the Inter-American
Court: Reflections on a Litigation Experience, 13 HAMLINE L. REV. 507, 523 (1990).
70 See Farer, supra note 20, at 543-44.
71

See Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 76 AM. J.

INT'LL. 231,

231 (1982).

See American Convention, supra note 14, arts. 52-54.
73 See Frost, supra note 67, at 187.
72

74 See Statute of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, art. 16, reprinted in
BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM,

supra note 14, at 138 [hereinafter Statute of the Court]; Buergenthal, supra note 71, at
233.
75 American Convention, supra note 14, art. 64. See generallyDAVIDSON, supra note
5, at 99-128 (discussing the Court's advisory opinions); Thomas Buergenthal, The
Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1
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Member States may also request an opinion concerning the compatibility of
domestic laws with these treaties.76
Unlike its advisory jurisdiction, the Court's contentious jurisdiction
does not apply to a Member State unless that Member State has ratified the
American Convention and specifically acceded to the Court's contentious
jurisdiction. 77 Under its contentious jurisdiction, the Court may render a
binding judgment, award damages to an injured party, and order that a
breach of the American Convention be remedied.78 This Note addresses the
Court's contentious jurisdiction.
2. The Procedures Before the Court
The Court's procedures also add to the amount of time that it takes a
petition to navigate the system. When the Court receives an application to
hear a case, the respondent State and the Commission appoint their
delegates within one month of notification of the application by the
Secretary of the Court. 79 Preliminary objections, such as those based upon
grounds for inadmissibility, must be filed within two months of notification
of the application.80 Presentation of preliminary objections does not
suspend the proceedings on the merits. The parties may submit written
briefs on these objections within thirty days of notification of the
objections. 82 The respondent has four months from the date of notification
to file an answer.83 Next, the parties may enter additional written pleadings
with the permission of the President of the Court and within the time limits
set by the President. 84
Oral proceedings commence after the pleadings are filed. The
President sets the date for oral proceedings.85 The parties may only offer
(1985); Buergenthal, supra note 71, at 242-45 (discussing the Court's advisory
jurisdiction).
76 See American Convention, supra note 14, art. 64.
77 See id. art. 62(3). See generally DAVIDSON, supra note 5, at 61-98 (discussing the
Court's use of its contentious jurisdiction); Buergenthal, supra note 71, at 23541(discussing the Court's contentious jurisdiction).
78 See American Convention, supra note 14, art. 63(1).
79 See Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, art. 35(3),
reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM, supra note 14, at 145 [hereinafter Rules of the Court].
80 See id. art. 36(1).
81 See id. art. 36(4).
82
83

See id. art. 36(5).
See id. art. 37.

84 See id. art. 38.

85 See id. art. 39.
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evidence if the application, reply, or preliminary objections give
notification of the evidence, although exceptional circumstances allow for
flexibility. 86 The Court may also obtain evidence on its own motion, invite
the parties to provide useful evidence, or even commission one of its
members to obtain evidence through an in situ investigation. 87 The State has
88
the burden of producing evidence over which it has exclusive control,
although a recent decision has brought this rule into question. 89 The Court
may discontinue the case at any time if a friendly settlement has been
90
reached or if the party bringing the case does not intend to proceed with it.
The power of the Court to order provisional measures under its
contentious jurisdiction also bears noting. In "cases of extreme gravity and
urgency," the Court may order a government to take provisional measures
to prevent "irreparable damage to persons." 91 This power extends to cases
before the Commission that have not yet been submitted to the Court. 92
Until recently, governments have recognized the importance of and
attended the Court's hearings concerning 3 provisional measures, usually
putting forth the appearance of compliance.9
The Court begins its decision-making process after the completion of
oral proceedings. The Court conducts a general discussion of the case and
comes to a basic agreement about the salient issues and the manner in
which they should be handled. 94 The Court does not follow a particular
decision-making methodology. In general a judge assigned by the President
drafts an opinion, or in complex matters several judges are assigned to write
proposals. The provisional opinion or proposals become the basis for the
Court's deliberations after the initial discussion of the case. 95 The
provisional opinions or proposals are distributed before the Court meets, so
that each member of the Court arrives for deliberations ready to make
revisions.96 The Court then renders its decision and establishes reparations

86 See id. art. 43.
87 See id. art. 44.
88 See Velisquez Rodriguez Case (Judgment of July 29, 1988), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 4, at para. 135 (1988).
89 See Gangaram Panday Case, (Judgment of Jan. 21, 1994), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 16, at para. 68 (1994) (stating that the Court's decision was based on inference);
Pasqualucci, supra note 39, at 346.

90 See Rules of the Court, supra note 79, arts. 52-53.
91 American Convention, supra note 14, art. 63(2).
92 See id.
93 See Pasqualucci, supranote 3, at 844-45.
94 See Frost, supra note 67, at 184.

95 See id. at 183-85.
96 See id at 184.
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necessary. 97 Either party may request an interpretation of the meaning or
scope of the judgment within ninety days of the notification of the
judgment.9 8 The President may invite relevant written comments within an
established time limit.99 However, the request for interpretation will not
suspend the effect of the judgment. 0ot
if

3.

The Ambiguous Role of the Commission Before the Court:
Reinforcing Redundancy

The Commission's relationship with the Court initially appeared to be
an uneasy one. During the first decade of the Court's existence, the
Commission forwarded few cases to the Court, resulting in only three
contentious cases being decided by 1990.101 Some critics attribute this
phenomenon to institutional distrust and jealousy on the part of the
Commission, while others argue that the Commission simply was not
accustomed to working with the Court. 10 2 The Commission may have been
concerned with governmental attempts to use the Court to slow down the
Commission. 03 Also, the Commission's focus on country reports prevented
it from devoting its limited resources to individual petitions.'0 Whatever
the reason for the lack of cooperation between the Court and the
Commission, the Commission is now making more frequent use of the
Court's contentious jurisdiction.105
Once a case has been forwarded to the Court, the Commission's role is
ambiguous. The American Convention provides that the "Commission shall
appear in all cases before the [Clourt," but does not detail the role the
Commission plays before the Court.1°6 The Commission's intended role is
that of ministerio piblico, a "representative of the general interest of the
inter-American COmmunity.' ' 107 However, the Court undermined this role
by rejecting the Commission's assertion that its factual findings were

97 See Rules of the Court, supra note 79, arts. 56-57.

98 See American Convention, supra note 14, art. 67.
99 See Rules of the Court, supra note 79, art. 58(2).
1ooSee id. art. 58(4).
101See Frost, supra note 67, at 179.
102See id. at 178.
103See Farer, supra note 20, at 544.
104 See id.
105

See id.

106American Convention, supra note 14, at art. 57.
"o QUIROGA, supra note 19, at 169.
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binding upon the Court.' 08 According to the Court, it "is not bound by what
the Commission may have previously decided," because "[i]ts power to
examine and review all actions and decisions of the Commission derives
from its character as sole judicial organ . . . concerning the [American]
Convention."'1 9 In effect, the Court treats the Commission as the
representative of the victim-petitioner, and thus as an adversary before the
Court rather than a ministerio ptiblico."

II. THE PROBLEM OF BACKLOG AND DELAY INTHE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM
The above procedures create the potential for backlog and delay, a
common problem in both domestic and international tribunals. In both the
domestic and international spheres the problem bears similar characteristics
and attracts similar solutions. Part A of this section discusses backlog and
delay in domestic courts. Part B applies the analysis from Part A to the
Inter-American system.
A.

The Problem of Delay and Backlog Generally

Delay and backlog is a common problem in many domestic legal
systems.' Understanding the causes of backlog and delay in the domestic
context will assist in analyzing the Inter-American system. The causes of
backlog and delay are both systemic and procedural. Systemic causes of
backlog and delay can be traced to lack of resources. n Procedural causes
of backlog and delay include free access to courts without mechanisms to
deter frivolous suits, lack of court administration and case management
mechanisms (which lead to repetition, fragmentation,
and discontinuity),
13
and lack of incentives for consensual settlements.

108 See

John F. Stack, Jr., Human Rights in the Inter-American System: The Struggle

for Emerging Legitimacy?, in LAW ABOVE NATIONS: SUPRANATIONAL COURTS AND THE
LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS 99, 111-12 (Mary L. Volcansek ed., 1997).

109
Gangaram Panday Case, Judgment of Jan. 21, 1994, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
16, at para 41 (1994).
110See Medina, supra note 9, at 460; QUIROGA, supra note 19, at 170.

11 See Hiram E. Chodosh et al., Egyptian Civil Justice Process Modernization:A
Functionaland Systemic Approach, 17 MICH.J. INT'L L. 865, 871 (1996) (describing

backlog and delay as among the most critical legal problems confronted by domestic
legal systems around the world).
112 See Hiram E. Chodosh & Stephen A. Mayo, The PalestinianLegal Study:
Consensus and Assessment of the New PalestinianLegal System, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J.

375, 387 (1997).
113 See id. at 386-87.
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Practical solutions to limit backlog and delay are not easily
implemented.11 4 The obvious solution to systemic causes of delay is to
devote more resources to the system, but finite resources make this solution
impossible. Procedural solutions focus on "litigation prevention, procedural
streamlinin and case management measures, and alternative dispute
resolution. 'a l5 First, litigation prevention uses measures such as filing fees
and sanctions to deter frivolous use of the system." 6 These measures may
be undesirable, however, because they inhibit persons from exercising their
rights.1 7 Second, procedural streamlining and case management techniques
include implementing a strict timetable for filing documents with the court,
increasing the allocation of resources for court administration, and
increasing judicial intervention 18 These measures may enhance efficiency
at the cost of judicial impartiality and increase the complexity of pre-trial
procedure without adequate safeguards to control abuse.'19
Third,
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms include those employed at the
participants' consent to render binding decisions, as well as mechanisms
required by court order without the requirement that the dispute be
resolved.1 20 Alternative dispute mechanisms reduce the effect of resource
disparities by making a neutral judge or panel responsible for developing
legal argumentation and gathering evidence, rather than allocating that
responsibility to each party.
B. The Problem of Delay and Backlog in the Inter-American System
As in domestic legal systems, delay and backlog is a significant
problem in the Inter-American system. Commentators have long criticized
the slowness of the process from the petitioner's perspective. 12 As Sonia
Picado, former Vice-President for the Court, states, "[i]t takes a lot of time
and money to exhaust the domestic remedies, to then go to Washington to
the Commission, and then, if the Commission so decides (and in many
cases it does not), to take the case to the Court.' 123 Governments often
delay justice for victims of human rights abuses by exploiting the
114 See

115 Id.

Chodosh et al., supra note 111, at 872.
at 873.

116 See id. at 874.
117 See

id.

118 See id. at 874-75.
"1

See id. at 876.

120 See id. at 877.
121See id. at 878.
122 See

Committee on International Human Rights, Inter-American Commission on

Human Rights: A Promise Unfulfilled, 48 REC. OF THE Ass'N
N.Y. 589, 602-04 (1993); Farer, supra note 20, at 527-28.
123

Frost, supra note 67, at 180.
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Commission's procedures.124 States may refuse to respond to requests for
information until the last possible moment or exceed their allotted reply
period by "promising" to reply if another extension is granted.' 25 These
tactics can result in significant delay before the Court even receives a case.
For example, the petition for the Veldsquez case, which was forwarded to
the Court on April 24, 1986, had been received by the Commission on
October 7, 1981.126 Ironically, the exploitation of these procedures by death
row petitioners is now a source of concern in the Caribbean countries.
1. Systemic Causes of Backlog and Delay
As in domestic systems, a significant cause of backlog and delay
within the Inter-American system is a lack of resources. The Commission
and the Court meet only on a part-time basis; thus the amount of work each

can accomplish is limited.' 28 Lack of financial resources limits the
possibility of full-time personnel, however desirable they might be. The
Commission's overall budget remains insufficient to fund its work.129
During the 1980s, the OAS Secretary-General "appropriated a slice of the
Commission's space, let its staff diminish, and watched its budget
shrink."' 13 Resources are unlikely to be significantly increased because the

OAS "is experiencing
an almost continual fiscal crisis that shows no signs
' 1
of abating."

124

See Pasqualucci, supra note 39, at 311.

125

See Christina Cerna, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Its

Organization and Examination of Petitions and Communications, in THE INTER-

(David J. Harris & Stephen Livingstone
eds., 1998).
126 See Velnsquez Rodriguez Case (Judgment of July 29, 1988), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 4) at para. 3 (1988); Michael Jose Corbera, Note, In the Wrong Place,at the
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 65, 96

Wrong Time: Problems with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights' Use of
ContentiousJurisdiction,25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 919, 933-39 (1993)(discussing the

Veldsquez case). See generally Mdndez & Vivanco, supra note 69 (discussing the
authors' experience as lawyers for the petitioners in the Honduran cases).
127 See discussion infra Part fII.B.
128 See Frost, supra note 67, at 189 (mentioning the need for the Court to meet more
frequently if its docket grows).
129See

Vivanco, supra note 28, at 79 (discussing the Commission's financial

constraints and dependency on the OAS); cf. Pasqualucci, supra note 3, at 862 (arguing
that resources should be diverted from social and cultural programs of questionable
impact in comparison to the importance of the work of the Court and the Commission).
130 Farer, supranote 20, at 542.
131 Pasqualucci,

supra note 3, at 862.
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2. Procedural Causes of Backlog and Delay
The system's procedures can foster delay in four ways. First, the
requirement that domestic remedies be exhausted delays the initial filing of
a petition. Second, the bifurcated nature of the system delays a binding
judgment on petitions until both the Commission and the Court process the
petition. Third, the Commission does not follow its procedures closely so
that it can give greater leeway to governments. Fourth, the Court's
interpretation of the Commission's role as advocate causes duplicative
review processes.
a. Facilitating the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies
Because petitions are inadmissible if domestic remedies are not
exhausted, delay may occur while the petitioner navigates the domestic
domestic remedies be
legal system. However, the requirement that 132
exhausted is necessary to preserve state sovereignty.
Although this necessary requirement does foster delay, exceptions to
the rule facilitate the processing of petitions. Domestic remedies need not
be exhausted if they are not realistic possibilities.133 Indigent petitioners and
petitioners unable to secure legal counsel because of generalized fear in the
legal community need not exhaust domestic remedies.1M Lastly, the
requirement that the State asserting non-exhaustion demonstrate the
existence of effective domestic remedies prevents government
stonewalling. 135 These exceptions facilitate the lodging of a petition within
the system, limiting the harshness of a necessary rule.
b. The Inefficiency of a Bifurcated System
The bifurcated nature of the system is another source of delay. 136 As is
apparent from the system's procedures, the Commission's need to maintain
flexibility causes much time to pass before it takes definitive action. When
the Commission does forward a case to the Court, a final disposition of the
matter in question takes even longer, as can be seen from the Velasquz
case mentioned above.

132 See

Cerna, supra note 125, at 85.

133 See

American Convention, supra note 14, art. 46(2)(a)-(c).

134 See

Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies, supra note 34.

135 See Veldsquez Rodriguez Case (Preliminary Objections) (Judgment of June 26,

1987), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 1, at para. 59 (1987).
136 See Pasqualucci, supra note 39, at 307-09.
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c. Bending the Rules
The Commission has often been criticized for failing to adhere to its
procedures. 137 When the first contentious cases were heard by the Court,
the Commission had "never really learned to file proper reports the way the
Convention requires," forcing the Court to do a great deal of fact-finding on
its own. 138 The need for flexibility stems from the dependence of the
Commission on the political organs of the OAS. 139 The Commission is a
prisoner "of the unending paradox of having been created and being
nourished directly by the subjects" it is meant to regulate. 1 The
Commission is required to obtain express authorization from the secretarygeneral of the OAS any time an expenditure exceeds $50, which clearly
shows the vulnerable position of the Commission. 14 1 The Commission also
needs to be flexible because it cannot render decisions that are binding upon
Member States, unlike the Court. Inflexibility limits the Commission's
ability to secure compliance and increases the odds of retaliation by the
objects of its investigations.
d. The Role of the Commission Before the Court
The Court's treatment of the Commission also fosters delay. As
mentioned above, the Commission is intended to be a ministerio publico
before the Court.142 However, the Court treats the Commission as the
petitioner's representative and has asserted the right to reject the
Commission's factual findings. 43 The Court's position ignores the
Commission's broad role within the system for which the appearance of
impartiality is essential.' 44 The Court's stance denies it the opportunity to
take advantage of the Commission as a fact-finder. This increases the
probability of unnecessarily duplicative processes by requiring independent
review of the facts by both the Commission and the Court in some cases.

137

See Committee on International Human Rights, supra note 122, at 592-97, 601-04,

607-09, 618.
138 Frost, supra note 67, at 180.
139

See Vivanco, supra note 28, at 79.

140

G6mez, supra note 68, at 173.

141 See Vivanco,

supra note 28, at 79.

142

See QUIROGA, supra note 19, at 169.

143

See Gangaram Panday Case, Judgment of Jan. 21, 1994, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)

No. 16, at para. 41 (1994).
144 See MEDINA QUIROGA, supra note

19, at 169-70.
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IR. THE PROBLEM OF DELAY AND THE UNDERMINING OF THE DEATH
PENALTY

As is apparent from the above discussion, systemic and procedural
factors cause delay and backlog in the Inter-American system. The delay
and backlog causes a particular problem in the processing of death row
petitions. Section A discusses how delay undermines rationales for applying
the death penalty. Section A also discusses the possibility that extended
stays on death row are cruel and unusual punishment. Section B discusses
the confrontation between the Inter-American system and its Caribbean
members concerning the relationship between delay and the death penalty.
A.

Death and Delay Generally

Procedural delay tends to undermine arguments in favor of the death
penalty. Death penalty supporters often bolster their position by arguments
based on deterrent and retributive effects of the death penalty. 45 Lengthy
stays on death row undermine both rationales for the application of the
death penalty. Additionally, such delay may be cruel, unusual, inhuman, or
degrading punishment.
First, increasing the amount of time between conviction and execution
undermines deterrence by attenuating the connection between execution
and conviction.146 The "deterrent force of penal laws is diminished to the
extent that persons contemplating criminal activity believe there is a
possibilit I47that they will escape punishment through repetitive collateral
attacks."
The imminence of death, rather than the abstract concept of
death, is the primary reason the death penalty can be an effective
deterrent. 148 Removing the imminence factor robs the death penalty of its
deterrent value. 149

145 See Ernest van den Haag, The Death Penalty Once More, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
957, 966 (1985).
146See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1046 (1995)(mem.)(noting that the deterrent

effect of execution after 17 years on death row is minimal).
147Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Capital Punishment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1041-42
(1989) (quoting Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452-53 (1986) (plurality opinion of
Powell, J.)).
148See ROGER E.

SCHWED,

ABOLITION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 40 (1983).

Arguably, the psychological harm of awaiting death could also be a deterrent. However,
if the death penalty itself does not operate as a deterrent, it is unlikely that awaiting death
could be a deterrent either.
149
This demonstrates the fundamental flaw with the deterrence rationale. The desire
to protect the rights of the accused, even minimally, will likely result in a delay that
undermines that rationale. However, this Note proceeds on the assumption that any
reduction in delay results in a corresponding increase in deterrent value.
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Second, delays in the application of the death penalty also undermine
the retribution rationale. "[T]o the extent that the desire to kill someone for
revenge diminishes with the time elapsed after his offense, the long delay
between the apprehension of a suspect and his execution may entirely
subvert the goal of retribution. ' ' 50 Also, the psychological harm of awaiting
death, combined
with actual execution, often exceeds the limits of
51
retribution.'
Third, the psychological harm associated with awaiting death may
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Awaiting execution on death row
can cause an individual severe mental suffering. 152 "Such an individual is..
. deprived of all the creature comforts of life, forced to contemplate a
sudden and violent death by a means already ordained and known to him or
her. It is a period during which the soul and spirit of any mortal is severely
tested. ' 153 One prisoner spoke of a recurrent nightmare in which he dreamt
of himself "walking down the tier, sitting down in it, them hooking it up
Waking up sweating, the prisoner felt as if he were
and turning it on."
having a heart attack. 155 The adverse psychological effects of awaiting
death over a long period of time are clear.
Some national and international courts have recognized such
psychological effects as the "death row phenomenon" and found the
phenomenon to be cruel, unusual, inhuman or degrading punishment. The
European Court of Human Rights, for example, refused to allow extradition
of a German national to the United States on a murder charge because of
the death row phenomenon, holding that the physical and mental conditions

1o ScHWED, supra note

148, at 45.

151 See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. at 1045 (stating that the State's retributive interest
may already be satisfied by the punishment inflicted by the prolonged stay on death
row).

152 See DAVID PANNICK, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DEATH PENALTY

72, 84, 86-87

(1982).
153 Watt Espy, Facing the Death Penalty, in FACING THE DEATH PENALTY: ESSAYS ON
A CRUEL AND UNUSUALPUNISHIMENT 27, 27 (Michael L. Radelet ed., 1989).
154 ROBERT JOHNSON,

CONDEMNED TO DIE: LIFE UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH 88

(1981). See generallyBURTON H. WOLFE, PILEUP ON DEATH Row (1973) (discussing the
impact of conditions on death row on condemned prisoners); Espy, supra note 153
(discussing the thoughts and emotions of prisoners on death row); William A. Schabas,
Developments in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Execution Delayed, Execution
Denied, 5 CRIM. L.F. 180 (1994) (discussing the growing judicial sentiment that delayed
execution constitutes inhuman treatment); Richard E. Shugrue, "A Fate Worse Than
Death" - An Essay on Whether Long Times on Death Row are Cruel Times, 29
CREIGHTONL. REV. 1 (1995).
155See JOHNSON, supra note 154.
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of prisoners156 on death row in Virginia constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not decided the issue, one
Justice has recognized its significance in Lackey v. Texas.157 Charles Allen
Lackey, the defendant, argued that his execution after seventeen years on
death row would violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment. 158 Although the Court denied certiorari, Justice
Stevens noted that the claim was "not without foundation." 159 Because the
benefits of the death penalty seemed minimal, a "penalty with such
negligible returns to the State would be patently excessive and cruel and
unusual punishment."' 160 Nevertheless, the Court postponed consideration of
the issue.161
B.
Death and Delay in the Caribbean: The Inter-American
System's New Challenge
The most significant court decision concerning the death row
phenomenon took place in the Caribbean. The importance of the decision
can only be understood in the context of the political climate in the region.
Executions have increased due to the rise in violent crime.162 Jamaica saw a
new record in the number of murders in 1997, at 1,038.163 The rise in
violent crime has created corresponding domestic support for moving away
from the de facto abolition of the death penalty in the Caribbean. For
example, in the Bahamas "[d]ozens of Bahamians cheered when death
notices from the gallows were solemnly posted after two executions."1 65

156

See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 5-6 (1989); see also

Renee E. Boxman, Comment, The Road to Soering and Beyond: Will the United States
Recognize the "Death Row Phenomenon?", 14 Hous. J. INT'LL. 151, 151, 162 (1991).
157 See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S.
1045, 1045 (1995) (mem.) (postponing
consideration of the "death row phenomenon"); see also Shugrue, supra note 154, at 3.
158 See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. at 1045.
159 Id.
'60

Id. at 1046.

161

See id. at 1045; see also McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1484-89 (9th Cir. 1995)

(Norris, J., dissenting) (supporting an Eighth Amendment claim based on delay in
execution).
162

See

ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE

45 (2d ed.

1996).
163 See Shelley Emling, Crime Epidemic Revives Hangings in Caribbean,ATLANTAJ.-

Sept. 20, 1998, at A14.
See id.

CONST.,

164

165Bahamians Applaud News

of Executions, BOSTON

GLOBE,

Oct. 16, 1998, at A21.
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However, a recent decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
16 Council
complicated the application of the death penalty in the Caribbean.
In Pratt v. Jamaica, the Privy Council recognized the death row
phenomenon and held that a delay of more than five years creates 167a
presumption of "inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment."
Such a delay requires commutation of the prisoner's sentence to life
imprisonment. 168 The presumption of inhuman or degrading punishment
exists not only when the State is at fault for creating the delay by its action
or inaction, but also when the prisoner is legitimately utilizing all avenues
of appeal made available by the State. 169 If the delay is due to the escape
from custody of the accused or his frivolous use of the appellate process in
order to waste time, however, this rule does not apply. 170
In response to the Pratt decision, the Caribbean countries are
171
attempting to streamline the appellate process for death row prisoners.
These efforts necessarily address the procedures of the Inter-American
system and possibly undermine the system's legitimacy. Even if a Member
State can reduce delay in domestic courts, the Caribbean efforts would be to
no avail if delay is not addressed in the Inter-American system. Delay at
this level contributes years to the appellate process, as is evident from the
above discussion of the system's procedures. For example, Trevor Fisher
and Richard Woods, the two Bahamians who were executed, had been
convicted in 1994 and 1995, respectively, and appealed the sentences to the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 1996.172 By October of
1998, the Commission had taken no action other than to encourage the
Bahamas to stay the execution. 173
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have responded to delay by
attempting to impose time limits on the Commission's processing of
individual petitions. 74 The Court has heard oral argument concerning these

16 The Privy Council is the highest court of appeal in some cases in the British
Commonwealth. See Roget V. Bryan, Toward the Development of a Caribbean
Jurisprudence: The Case for Establishing a Caribbean Court of Appeal, 7 J.
TRANSNA'L L. & POL'Y 181, 183-87 (1998) (discussing the history and jurisdiction of
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council).
167 See Pratt v. Attorney Gen. for Jamaica, 4 All E.R. 769, 788-89 (P.C. 1993).
16sSee

id.

169See

id. at 786-87.

170 See id. at 783.
171 See

Emling, supra note 163.

172

See BahamiansApplaud News of Executions, supra note 165.

173

See id.

174

See Estrella Gutierrez, Rights-Americas: Trinidadand Tobago Stands up to OAS,

Inter Press Service, June 4, 1998, availablein 1998 WL 5987579.
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external time limits, but has yet to render a decision. 175 Despite an urgent
appeal by the President of the Court, Trinidad and Tobago refused to attend
the hearing and notified the Court that it would not accept responsibility for
the Commission's procedural failures. 76 Meanwhile, Trinidad and Tobago
defied the Court by setting the date for the execution only days after the
Court ordered provisional measures to protect the lives of the petitioners.177
The Court reported Trinidad and Tobago's intransigence to the OAS
General Assembly, which failed to act, resulting in the execution of nine
individuals within days of the General Assembly's meeting. 178 Thus, the
Caribbean countries have announced their intention to flout the 79measures
rather than risk having to commute sentences to life imprisonment. 1
Under the status quo, appeals through local courts and up to the InterAmerican system are likely to exceed the five-year limit imposed by the
Privy Council. 180 The Privy Council estimated that appeal to international
organizations such as the Commission should take approximately eighteen
months. 181 The process before the Commission is longer than the Privy
Council estimated, fueling the suspicions of the Caribbean countries. 18 2 The
Caribbean countries believe that the Inter-American system and the Privy
Council are conspiring to undermine application of the death penalty.
See Schiffrin, supra note 2, at 567. Jamaica imposed a seven-month restriction on
proceedings before the Commission, and Trinidad and Tobago has imposed a similar
limit. See id. at 567 & n.31. The Privy Council held that such action was not legitimate.
175

See Wesley Gibbings, Rights: Trinidad and Tobago Temporarily Thwarted on Death

Penalty, Inter Press Service, Jan. 28, 1999, available in 1999 WL 5946798 (1999). The
Privy Council allotted eighteen months for review by the Commission or the U.N.
Human Rights Committee. See Pratt, 4 All E.R. at 788; Schiffrin, supra note 2, at 567.
176 See Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Communicado de Prensa(visited
Sept. 10, 1999) <http://corteidh-oea.nu.or.cr/ci/Prensa/Doc9.htm>.
177 See Trinidad Plans to Hang 5 Killers, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), June
25, 1998, at 22A.
178 See Douglas W. Cassell Jr., Court's Promise Now in Peril,CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
July 13, 1999, at 6.
179

See Bahamas Will Hang Two Killers Despite Opposition, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS,

Oct. 15, 1998, at Dll, available in 1998 WL 19040981. Lest this action be taken as
mere posturing, it is important to note that Trinidad and Tobago has shown itself willing
to execute prisoners even while appeals were pending, as happened when Glen Ashby
was executed on July 14, 1994. See HOOD, supra note 162, at 127.
180 See Schiffrin, supra note 2, at 567.
181See Pratt, 4 All E.R. at 788 (P.C. 1993).
182 See

Eric Nurse, Jamaica Premier:Keep Death Penalty, Associated Press, Nov. 2,

1998, available in 1998 WL 21782233 (discussing Jamaica's accusations that
international organizations and the Privy Council are conspiring to abolish the death
penalty in the Caribbean).
183 See Bahamas Will Hang Two Killers Despite Opposition, supra note 179.
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Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago are withdrawing from the system in
response to this problem, and Barbados intends to do likewise.18 4
Expediting the procedures before the Commission and Court are necessary
to address these concerns. 185 The measures already taken by Jamaica and
Trinidad and Tobago indicate that these countries will take whatever
measures are necessary to continue executions rather than risk de facto
abolition of the death penalty.18 6 Maintaining the present course will cause
the Caribbean countries to leave the system. If keeping the Caribbean
countries within the system is necessary to most effectively promote human
rights, change is necessary.
IV. MAINTAIN OR REFORM? THE FUTURE OF THE SYSTEM

The Inter-American system may be weakening due to the defection of
the Caribbean countries. 187 The future effectiveness of the system depends
on its response to the concerns of these countries. Part A of this section
introduces the analytical framework applied by this Note to assess the status
quo and proposed reforms. Part B evaluates the status quo and concludes
that adhering to current practice is detrimental to the system. Part C
examines several possible reforms, and recommends an optional fast track
process for death row petitioners as the most effective reform.
Evaluation Criteria

A.

An ideal situation would maintain or enhance the system's protection
of human rights in four primary areas. 188 First, the system must be capable
of preventing the use of death penalty in situations prohibited by the
See Gutierrez, supra note 174. The same concerns have already prompted Jamaica
to denounce the optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (which allows individual petitions under the Covenant). See Schiffrin, supranote
2, at 563. Trinidad and Tobago has done likewise. See id. at 567 n.31. The Caribbean
countries are also moving to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of
184

the Privy Council. See Michelle Faul, CaribbeanMay Use Death Penalty, Associated

Press, June 4, 1999, available in 1999 WL 17810547. Ironically, in its decision the
Privy Council stated that they "wish to say nothing to discourage Jamaica from
continuing its membership of these bodies and from benefiting from the wisdom of their
deliberations." Pratt, 4 All E.R. at 788.
18 Cf. Jos6 Miguel Vivanco, HRW and CEJIL Call on Trinidad and Tobago to
Reconsider Withdrawalfromthe American Convention on Human Rights (visited Sept. 1,

1998) <http:llwww.hrw.org/hrw/press98/june/t&tO604.htm> (urging Trinidad and
Tobago to support reform by expediting the system rather than by withdrawing from the
system).
186 See HooD, supra note 162, at 44-46.
187 See Cassell, supra note 178.
188 These may not be the only possible areas of concern for the system, but they seem
most pertinent here.
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American Convention. Under Article 4, the death penalty may not be
extended to crimes to which it does not apply at the time of ratification or
be reestablished in States where it has been abolished. 8 9 Capital
punishment is prohibited for political offenses or related common crimes.190
States Parties may not execute persons below the age of eighteen, persons
above the age of seventy, and pregnant women. 191 An ideal solution would
allow the system to monitor compliance with these prohibitions.
Second, the system must be capable of preventing unjust application of
the death penalty. This requires that the system have the ability to ensure
conformity with the requirements
of procedural due process as protected in
92
the American Convention.1
Third, the system must prevent protracted stays on death row because
of the human rights concerns arising as a result of such delays. Although
the Convention does not explicitly recognize the death row phenomenon as
a human rights concern, its growing recognition as "cruel, inhuman, or
degrading punishment
or treatment" could incorporate it under Article 5 of
93
the Convention. 1
Fourth, and most importantly, protecting human rights in non-death
penalty cases must not be prejudiced. 194 Because death penalty cases are
only a portion of all cases proceeding through the system, victims of nondeath penalty related human rights abuses must be protected while efforts
are made to reform the system as applied to death penalty petitions. While
efforts to make the system more efficient could also benefit these victims
by streamlining the petition process generally, some of these victims could
lose access to the system as a result of reforms. This Note assumes that a
greater number of persons protected takes precedence over efficiency
concerns.
The system's performance in these areas is affected by the perceived
impact upon domestic criminal justice systems. If a Member State feels its
criminal justice goals are subverted because of the system, it is less likely to
support the system and more likely to withdraw from its obligations, thus
weakening the system. One way this may occur is if the system's long
delays undermine the deterrent and retributive goals of applying the death
penalty. A second way this may occur is when a reform significantly
strengthens the system and threatens to significantly interfere with domestic
criminal justice systems. The negative criminal justice effects could induce
189 See

American Convention, supra note 14, art. 4(2)-(3).

190 See id. art. 4(4).
191See id. art. 4(5).
192 See id. art. 8
'93 Id. art. 5.
194 Other possible areas of human rights protection exist, but for purposes of this
evaluation these areas seem to be the most salient.
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State parties to the American Convention to withdraw from the system or
prevent non-parties from ratifying the Convention. Because only twentyfive of the thirty-five Member States of the OAS have ratified the American
Convention, of which seventeen have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court, 195 it is essential that no course of action cause this result in the
absence of countervailing benefits to the system in the above areas.
The effects upon the criminal justice system in the United States and
the impact upon the possibility of ratification of the American Convention
by the United States are of particular concern. The United States'
ratification of the American Convention and accession to the Court's
jurisdiction may influence other States to do likewise, bolstering the
strength of the system. 96 Although the primary reason for United States'
197
failure to ratify the American Convention is protection of its sovereignty,
the evident concern for delay caused by domestic legal processes 98 tends to
show that further delay caused by international institutions will meet
considerable resistance in the United States.1 99 Even if the U.S. Supreme
Court does not recognize the death row phenomenon, the long delays in the
death penalty process do undermine the deterrence rationale, one

195

See Christina M. Cerna, InternationalLaw and the Protectionof Human Rights in

the Inter-American System, 19 Hous. J. INT'LL. 731, 737 (1997).
196

See James C. Kitch, Note, The American Convention on Human Rights: The

Propriety and Implications of United States Ratification, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 359, 394

(1979). This seems especially true in light of the effect of the Carter administration's
support for the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, which persuaded enough
countries to ratify the Convention to bring it into force. See Farer, supra note 20, at 52021. Of course, this logic relies on the assumption that the United States would adhere to
the Court's decisions, a dubious proposition. See Corbera, supra note 126, at 945-49.
197 See Cerna, supra note 195, at 732-39.
198 See Donald L. Beschle, What's Guilt (or Deterrence) Got to Do With It?: The
Death Penalty, Ritual, and Mimetic Violence, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 487, 499-500

(1997) (referring to the U.S. Supreme Court's "growing impatience with the length of
postconviction proceedings"); Jack Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital

Punishment,99 HAgv. L. REv. 1670, 1673-75 (1986) (noting that expedited procedures
are responsible for the current level of executions); Thurgood Marshall, Remarks on the
Death Penalty Made at the Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit, 86 COLUM. L.

REv. 1, 4-5 (1986) (discussing the "Rush to Judgment," the "willingness of courts and
the state governments to expedite proceedings in order to bring about speedy
executions").
199 U.S. resistance to the World Court's order that it stay the execution of Paraguayan
national Angel Breard supports the argument that the United States will fight measures
of international courts that result in prolonging the immediacy of executions. Cf.
Douglass Cassel, The World Court, Washington and the Rule of Law, CHI. TRIB., Apr.
13, 1998, at 11; Philippe Sands, An Execution Heard Round the World, L.A. TIMES, Apr.

16, 1998, at B9.
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justification for the death penalty in the United States.2 00 Failure to address
long delays will give the United States another reason not to subject itself to
the system's procedures. °1 If the United States shows tangible support for
the system, i.e. by ratifying the Convention and acceding to the contentious
jurisdiction of the Court, the system could attain the level of strength it held
in the early 1980s. The importance of the United States' actions in securing
support for the system is essential.20 2
B.

The Failure of the Status Quo to Protect Human Rights

Although domestic politics within the Caribbean may yet cause
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago to back down from threats to withdraw
from the system, these countries will most likely adhere to their present
course because of the negative effects upon their domestic criminal justice
systems. Since this will reduce the system's ability to protect human rights
overall, the status quo must be abandoned.
1.

The Failure of the Status Quo to Prevent the Death Penalty

Under the status quo, the system will not be able to prevent the use of
the death penalty in a manner inconsistent with the American Convention.
The long procedural delays harm Jamaica's and Trinidad and Tobago's
criminal justice systems. Frustrated by this, they intend to withdraw from
the system to ensure their ability to execute prisoners. This result is not
outweighed by any apparent countervailing effect upon the goal of
preventing the death penalty. Although keeping these Member States within
the system will not prevent the use of the death penalty in these countries,
the American Convention would limit the class of permissible uses. 203 By
inducing these Member States to leave the system, the status quo will
prevent the system from monitoring compliance with death penalty
prohibitions found in Article 4.
200 See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1046 (1995) (mem.) (noting that the deterrent
effect of execution after seventeen years on death row is minimal).
201 From the American Convention's inception, the United States has had many

objections to the Convention. See Kitch, supra note 196, at 376-87 (discussing the State
Department's reservations to the Convention's provisions).
m The importance of U.S. support was also evident in relation to on-site
investigations conducted by the Commission. In 1977, the United States revived the then
dormant on-site investigation by supporting an increase in the Commission's budget and
allowing the Commission to conduct an investigation on U.S. territory. See Robert E.
Norris, Observations In Loco: Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, 15 TEx. INT'LL.J. 46, 47 (1980). Within the next year,
two investigations had been conducted, two others were being planned, and the General
Assembly of the OAS recommended that Member States consent to on-site
investigations. See id. at 47-48.
203 See American Convention, supra note 14, art. 4.
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The Failure of the Status Quo to Prevent Unjust Application of
the Death Penalty

The loss of Member States due to the perceived negative effect of
delay upon their criminal justice processes will also reduce the system's
ability to prevent unjust application of the death penalty. Arguably, the
Commission and the Court can more closely scrutinize those countries
remaining within the system to ensure the observance of procedural due
process. Having more time to investigate allows the Commission to be
more accurate in preventing the unjust application of the death penalty. This
benefit will be minute, however, if most petitions are not death penaltyrelated. Thus, the defection of the Caribbean countries will not be offset by
greater protection for those cases processed within the system.
3.

The Failure of the Status Quo to Prevent Protracted Stays on
Death Row

The system's delays will add to protracted stays on death row. The
reduction in the number of countries monitored by the Commission and the
Court will reduce the system's ability to prevent protracted stays on death
row. The system's failure to address delays in death penalty cases will
result in a possible violation of Article 5 in countries that remain within the
system, if the death row phenomenon is recognized as a human rights
violation in the system. Only States outside of the system will be able to
reduce delay. Thus, any positive effect the status quo has in this area is due
to the efforts of those countries that leave or remain outside of the system,
rather than by any activities of the system itself.
4.

The Failure of the Status Quo to Protect Human Rights in NonDeath Penalty Cases

The system's ability to protect human rights in cases involving nondeath penalty related human rights violations will be significantly damaged
under the status quo. A State's withdrawal from the American Convention
will remove all protections for citizens of that State, in both death penalty
and non-death penalty cases.20 4 Such an extreme result is unjustifiable in
the absence of strong reasons for not addressing the cause of the delay. This
Note argues that delay can be addressed without engendering strong reasons
against change.
The Caribbean defection must be halted to prevent these negative
effects from coming to pass. If reform is possible with less detrimental
effects than those that exist under the status quo, such reform must be
attempted.

2u4 See Vivanco, supra note 185.
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Reforming the System

Reform without decay is possible. This section anticipates the effects
of several possible reforms, most of which are procedural. 20 5 This Note
emphasizes the need to protect human rights as widely as possible. For this
reason, litigation prevention measures that may be helpful in domestic legal
systems are inappropriate. 206 Also, the Commission itself is partly an
alternative dispute resolution mechanism through its friendly settlement
procedure, so such measures are improper as well. This Note focuses on
procedural streamlining and case management techniques, although
mention is made of institutional reforms as well.
This section evaluates five options for reform. First, the Commission
and the Court could be made full-time institutions. Second, changing the
Commission's role before the Court could make the process less
duplicative. Third, stricter adherence to the Commission's procedures could
be required. Fourth, the Commission and the Court could be merged along
the lines of the proposed merger of their European counterparts. Lastly, this
Note evaluates a fast track process for death penalty petitions. This Note
concludes that of all the foregoing proposals, the fast track best protects
human rights by respecting domestic criminal justice systems with minimal
detriment to the system's goals.
1. Full-time Institutions
Increasing the system's resources so that the institutions may meet on
a full-time basis could reduce delay. Such a solution, although an ideal one,
is unlikely to be feasible because of the lack of available financial
resources. Even were such action feasible, Member States will resist taking
a step that will strengthen the system's position and enable it to
significantly interfere with domestic criminal justice processes. Because
this reform is infeasible, it is not further addressed here.
2. Changing the Commission's Role Before the Court
Another option for reducing delay is to give the Commission a
factfmding role on behalf of the Court and to require the Court to accept the
findings of the Commission. This will reduce duplicative factfmding
processes. The change in processing time may be insufficient, however,
because most delay and backlog takes place while the Commission is

205 The contemplated effects are necessarily speculative in nature, but are based upon
the history of the system.
206 Shortening petition processing time may or may not prevent litigation by
dissuading petitioners from filing within the system. Any delay may prompt death row
petitioners to file hoping their sentences will be commuted after five years of delay.
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processing the petition.20 7 Also, the Commission could no longer act as the
link between the individual and the Court because it must appear to be
neutral. Thus, the individual must be accorded direct standing before the
Court, a result that may be unpalatable for many States. 20 Unlike the
Commission, individuals are not subject to political pressures, allowing
them to zealously protect their interests. Thus, while some States might
remain with the system because the delay problem is addressed, others will
leave because they object to the enhanced status of the individual.
a. Effect Upon Prevention of the Death Penalty
If this reform reduces delay, the Caribbean States will remain within
the system. This will allow the system to continue monitoring the use of the
death penalty so it is not applied in situations prohibited by the Convention.
Enhancing the individual's status within the system will interfere
significantly with domestic affairs, however. This interference could induce
other States to defect. Thus, the effects of this reform would be identical to
the status quo.
b. Effect Upon Prevention of Unjust Application of the Death Penalty
This reform will cripple the system's ability to monitor procedural due
process guarantees. As discussed above, the States remaining within the
system will be offset by the new defectors. Even if these cancel each other
out, requiring the Court to accept the Commission's factual conclusions
might result in less accuracy because only a single body will review the
facts. This will reduce the thoroughness of the system's oversight of
domestic judicial systems.
c. Effect Upon Prevention of Protracted Stays on Death Row
This reform will help prevent protracted stays on death row by
reducing delay. Even if the retention of the Caribbean countries is offset by
the defection of States that oppose individual standing, the overall effect
will be to reduce the processing time of petitions. Petitions will be
processed more efficiently than they are currently for petitioners on death
row in any State within the system.
d. Effect Upon Non-Death Penalty Cases
This reform will not successfully protect the greatest number of people
from abuse of their human rights. The overall number of human rights
2W Cf. Cerna, supra note 125, at 96 (stating that the Secretariat's workload is
responsible at least in part for extensions and delays).
2o See Padilla, supra note 50, at 109-11 (noting that the Convention has only been
ratified by two-thirds of the thirty-five member states of the OAS).
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violations the system can monitor will remain unchanged because of the
setoff between States that remain within the system and those that defect.
Also, justice will be speedier in those States that remain within the system,
but at the cost of reduced accuracy. Even if efficient and accurate justice
were possible, the desire to ensure a more global protection of human rights
should take precedence over the desire to make the system more efficient.
Thus, even if this reform were to limit the delays sufficiently, it is not
the most effective choice. The potential to retain the Caribbean countries
within the system may be offset by other defections and by the
unwillingness of non-Parties to ratify the American Convention and accept
the contentious jurisdiction of the Court. The net effect would be identical
to that observed under the status quo, except for the positive effect on the
system's ability to prevent protracted stays on death row.
3. Requiring Adherence to the Commission's Rules
The Commission often bends its rules to deal flexibly with Member
States of the OAS. 2°9 Requiring the Commission to closely adhere to its
own procedures and time limits has often been recommended as an
important reform to the system 21 0 This reform may ultimately prove to be
infeasible due to the volume of cases the Commission processes and the
inadequate resources available to allow the Commission to process petitions
efficiently.21 1 If the reform is practicable, it will increase predictability and
efficiency in the processing of individual petitions. There will be a
corresponding decline in the system's flexibility, however.
The lack of flexibility could result in three possible outcomes. First,
the Commission will often have to act without information that it cannot
obtain from Member States. Second, the Commission will not be able to
coax Member States to comply with its recommendations, resulting in
noncompliance and undermining the system's legitimacy. Third, Member
States might choose not to participate in the system because they can no
longer manipulate its procedures.
a. Effect Upon Prevention of the Death Penalty
The system's ability to prevent use of the death penalty inconsistent
with the American Convention will not change from the status quo. The
Caribbean members will be retained at the cost of losing other States and
discouraging compliance. The system's institutions will have to act on
incomplete information, harming its ability to monitor the use of the death
penalty.
209 See supra Part II.B.2.c.
210 See Committee on International Human Rights, supra note 122.
211See Cerna, supra note 125, at 96.
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b. Effect Upon Prevention of Unjust Application of the Death Penalty
This reform will also diminish the system's ability to prevent the
unjust application of the death penalty. Because monitoring procedural
guarantees of fair trial and the like may be fact-intensive, forcing the
Commission to act with incomplete information will detract from its ability
to protect these rights.
c. Effect Upon Prevention of Protracted Stays on Death Row
The Commission's increased adherence to its rules will have a positive
effect upon its ability to prevent protracted stays on death row. Protracted
stays on death row will be prevented not only within the Caribbean
countries, but in every State that is subject to the jurisdiction of the system.
d. Effect Upon Non-Death Penalty Cases
The negative effect of strict application of the Commission's
procedures will be most evident in the system's ability to protect human
rights generally. The Commission will no longer have the ability to bargain
with governments to gain information or concessions, forcing the
Commission to adopt reports with insufficient information. Also,
decreasing negotiation between the institutions and the Member States will
discourage state compliance with the Commission's recommendations and
the Court's decisions.
Requiring stricter adherence to the Commission's rules will thus
diminish the system's ability in every area except for preventing protracted
stays on death row. This reform must therefore be rejected.
4. Merging the Commission and the Court
To avoid the expense of having two full-time institutions, the
Commission and the Court could be merged to create a single Court.2 12 This
reform addresses concerns about lengthy procedures and duplicative work
by the two primary institutions of each system. 21 3 If this reform creates a
full-time institution, however, it will run into the same financial and
political difficulties discussed above.
If this proposal is economically feasible, merging the Commission and
the Court into a single Court might eliminate entirely the non-judicial
functions of the Commission. These functions include conducting
212

This would create a structure similar to that contemplated by the proposed Protocol

No. 11 to the European Convention on Human Rights. See DONNA GOMIEN ET AL.,

LAW
AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGH's AND THE EUROPEAN
SOCIAL CHARTER 91-92 (1996).
213

See Rudolf Bernhardt, Reform of the Control Machinery Under the European

Convention on Human Rights: ProtocolNo. 11, 89 AM. J. INT'LL. 145, 146-47 (1995).
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observations in loco and the production of country reports, as well as
friendly settlement procedures. This would reduce the system's flexibility.
Any petition being lodged could only be lodged within a body that
ultimately could render a binding judgment. Currently, Member States of
the OAS are reluctant to commit to the Convention and to subject
themselves to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.1 4 A consolidated
institution capable of rendering binding judgments is premature in light of
this reluctance. Also, as with making the Commission a neutral factfinder
on behalf of the Court, this reform will require giving the individual
standing. Creating a single tribunal with authority to render binding
judgments could induce Member States of the OAS to withdraw from the
system altogether.
a. Effect Upon Prevention of the Death Penalty
This reform's effect upon the ability of the system to prevent the use of
the death penalty will not differ from the status quo. The possible retention
of the Caribbean countries will be mirrored by a defection of countries that
object to the lack of nonbinding procedures, especially for States that have
not accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.
b. Effect Upon Prevention of Unjust Application of the Death Penalty
This reform will limit the system's ability to prevent the unjust
application of the death penalty. Any success in keeping the Caribbean
States within the system will be undermined by the loss of States that object
to submission to the jurisdiction of a tribunal competent to render binding
decisions. The effect will be worse than that under the status quo, however,
because cases processed by the system will only be scrutinized by a single
body, thus increasing the chance of error.
c. Effect Upon Prevention of Protracted Stays on Death Row
The effect upon prevention of protracted stays on death row is
uncertain. Assuming the number of countries ultimately subjecting
themselves to the jurisdiction of the system is no different from the status
quo, the greater efficiency provided by a single institution rather than a
bifurcated system will facilitate the individual petition process. More States
might be deterred from participation than would be true under the status
quo, however. Those that are deterred will not seek to reduce delay in their
own domestic legal processes. Thus, the system will be unable to monitor

See Pasqualucci, supra note 39, at 310. Although the compulsory jurisdiction of
the European Court has been accepted by all of the State parties to the European
Convention, only seventeen of twenty-five parties to the American Convention have
accepted the Inter-American Court's compulsory jurisdiction. See id.
214
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the duration of stays on death row, and States outside the system may not
be compelled to do so.
d. Effect Upon Non-Death Penalty Cases
The system's success in this area of protection depends upon the
overall effect on the number of States within the system compared to the
status quo. Judging by the number of States that have not acceded to the
Court's jurisdiction, however, it can be assumed that this reform will result
in more countries defecting from the system than would occur under the
status quo. There would thus be a negative effect upon the system's ability
to monitor human rights abuses in general. Also, the removal of a layer of
review of the facts will diminish the system's success in this area. Whether
this negative impact is an acceptable price to pay for speedy justice is a
matter of dispute. However, this Note takes the position that the scope of
protection should not be sacrificed for more efficient protection.
The merger solution, if feasible, is not desirable. It will limit
nonbinding procedures before the Commission and deter the participation
of those States that have not acceded to the Court's contentious jurisdiction.
5. The Fast Track Equilibrium
The most effective reform is to implement an optional "fast track'
process only for petitions by death row prisoners who are challenging an
abuse of their rights that may have led to the death sentence (such as the
lack of a fair trial). This process would not apply to petitions in non-death
penalty cases or to petitions by death row prisoners that are unrelated to the
imposition of the death sentence.
Under the fast track process, the Commission would prioritize
petitions by death row prisoners over all other petitions in the admissibility
review process. In addition to applying existing admissibility grounds, the
Commission determines whether the alleged abuse bears a significant
impact upon the imposition of the death sentence. Upon deciding that the
petition meets these requirements, the Commission forwards the case to the
Court.
The Commission then gathers facts on behalf of the Court, and the
Court accepts the Commission's factual conclusions unless controverted by
sufficient evidence produced by the State or by the petitioner. This process
would eliminate the possibility of
215 duplicative work created by the Court's
decision in Gangaram Panday, but only in death penalty cases. If the
Court is not involved in appellate review, as it asserted in Gangaram

215

See Gangaram Panday Case, (Judgment of Jan. 21, 1994), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.

C) No. 16, at para. 41 (1994) (explaining that the Court is not bound by the
Commission's findings).
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Panday,2 16 there should be no difficulty in eliminating the Commission's
nonbinding decision and the factual determinations because the Court
claims it conducts a de novo investigation.
Under the fast track process individuals could have standing to contest
the factual conclusions of the Commission and to argue based on those facts
before the Court, but only in this particular class of cases. Direct access to
the Court allows the individual to effectively exercise his rights and permits
the more cooperative relationship between the Commission and the Court
contemplated above.2 17
The increased use of the Court's contentious jurisdiction could be
considered a threat,2 18 as could giving the individual standing before the
Court. 219 This threat can be alleviated, however, by implementing the fast
track as an optional protocol to the Convention. This assures that States
voluntarily submit to the process. Limiting the process to death penalty
petitions only also diminishes this threat.
The likely result of implementing the fast track process as an optional
protocol relating to a select class of petitions is that only States concerned
with delay in the application of the death penalty will adopt the fast track.
Those that fear the proposal will strengthen the system need not ratify the
optional protocol. The fast track option thus allows the system to maximize
the number of countries in which it can monitor the use of the death penalty
so that it is only used as specified in the Convention. Also, limiting the fast
track process to death penalty petitions will prevent detrimental effects on
other areas of concern.
Facilitating death penalty petitions through the system quickly may
decrease the caseload of both institutions. If the current delays encourage
death row prisoners to use the system to prevent their execution, the
knowledge that there will be no significant delays will discourage frivolous
petitions filed for the sole purpose of producing delay. Thus, the overall
effect could be a reduction in cases. There may be salutary effects of a
proposal that eliminates some cases from the Commission's docket.
Perhaps the most significant effect is that the Commission could direct
some of its resources toward the publication of country reports or thematic
reports.
While the Commission may see a reduction in its workload, the
Court's docket will probably grow, necessitating more frequent sessions. In
accordance with Article 16 of the Court's statute, judges must remain at the
Court's disposal and "travel to the seat of the Court ...as often and for as

216

See id.
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See Vivanco, supra note 28, at 86-87.
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See Corbera, supra note 126, at 940-43.
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See Padilla, supra note 50, at 108-11.
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long a time as may be necessary." 220 The necessity of more frequent
meetings could cause financial difficulties because the compensation for the
Court's judges is based on the obligations and incompatibilities Articles 16
and 18 impose on them.221 The feasibility of the fast track option may be
limited by the resources of the Court and the infrequency of its meetings.
The judges on the Court have acknowledged that an increased volume of
cases, which might be caused by the fast track option, will require the Court
to modify its methodology.222 Granting the petitioner greater control over
the fact-finding process may alleviate this concern over the volume of
cases. Judges could also increasingly make use of information technology
in their deliberations. 223
a. Effect Upon Prevention of the Death Penalty
The fast track will enhance the system's ability to prevent the use of
the death penalty in situations that violate the American Convention. The
reform will maintain the greatest number of States within the system,
allowing the widest scope of monitoring. Also, the fast track will require
the Commission to flag death penalty cases and draw attention to such cases
sooner than they would otherwise be addressed. Thus, violations with
respect to the use of the death penalty will be prevented before a sentence
can be carried out in defiance of provisional measures ordered by the Court.
b. Effect Upon Prevention of Unjust Application of the Death Penalty
The effect of the fast track process on the prevention of the unjust
application of the death penalty will probably be positive. If those States
that would otherwise leave the system over concerns with the death row
phenomenon approve the optional protocol, more death penalty petitions
will be monitored than under the status quo. At the same time, however, the
reduced time available to scrutinize petitions will diminish the certainty of
the system's decisions. This tradeoff will be isolated by implementing the
fast track as an optional protocol, so that only those States that would have
removed themselves from scrutiny altogether will be affected. This will
allow greater scrutiny of States that do not adopt the protocol. If States that
would not have defected under the status quo adopt the protocol, the
reduced scrutiny could have a neutral or negative effect.

Statute of the Court, supra note 74, at art. 16.
art. 17.
22 See Frost, supra note 67, at 187-89.
m Cf. id. at 189 (stating that telephones and fax machines have allowed judges to
maintain continuity of communications during deliberations).
220

221 See id. at
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c. Effect Upon Prevention of Protracted Stays on Death Row
The fast track will reduce the incidence of the death row phenomenon.
The Caribbean States will remain within the system without fear of delay
undermining their criminal justice processes. Other States may be attracted
by the optional protocol as well. The fast track proposal will reduce delay in
death penalty cases for those countries that ratify the optional protocol, and
at worst, will have no effect upon countries that choose not to ratify the
protocol. Additionally, if the system eventually recognizes the death row
phenomenon as a human rights violation, a mechanism will already be in
place to reduce delay within the system. States attempting to reduce
domestic delay can do so with the assurance that the system will not
significantly add to delays.
d. Effect Upon Non-Death Penalty Cases
The fast track process will improve the system's protection of human
rights in non-death penalty cases by ensuring that the system has the
broadest jurisdictional scope. The fast track will retain the Caribbean States
within the system so that the system can monitor all abuses in these
countries. The effect upon non-death penalty cases in other countries is not
so certain, however. The priority given to death penalty petitioners by the
system could result in a diminishing emphasis on non-death penalty cases.
As already mentioned, however, this Note assumes that a wider scope of
application takes precedence over efficiency concerns.
The fast track proposal will result in an overall positive effect upon the
four goals not currently advanced under the status quo. The system will be
able to widely monitor the application of the death penalty and the
procedural safeguards of death penalty petitioners. Also, the proposal
prevents protracted stays on death row by limiting delay within the system.
Lastly, the fast track does not undermine human rights protection in nondeath penalty cases. The system will continue its present procedures in
these cases. This will give the Commission leeway to negotiate with States
and prevent threats to domestic criminal justice processes that arise under
other options for strengthening the system. Lastly, the potential for the use
of thematic reports in all of these areas due to the transfer of some duties
from the Commission to the Court will best protect human rights overall.
V. CONCLUSION
The Inter-American system for the protection of human rights is
facing a crisis. States are withdrawing from the system to secure effective
application of the death penalty. The defection of these countries from the
system undercuts the legitimacy of the system, which ultimately must rely
on the support of Member States as the source of the system's strength. The
scope of the system's purview is also diminished, preventing it from
maximizing its goals. The system does not have a legitimate countervailing
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interest in holding its ground. A fast track for death penalty-related petitions
would respond to the concerns of these countries without sacrificing the
system's goals. The fast track would accomplish this result while
maintaining, or even enhancing, the performance of the system in four
areas. First, the fast track will allow the system to prevent the application of
the death penalty in circumstances inconsistent with the American
Convention. Second, the system will be able to monitor the greatest number
of States to ensure observance of procedural rights that prevent the unjust
application of the death penalty. Third, the fast track process will prevent
long delays in the application of the death penalty. Fourth, implementing
the fast track process as an optional protocol ensures the widest scope of
countries within the system's jurisdiction and allows greater monitoring of
human rights violations in non-death penalty settings. The fast track process
advances these goals more effectively than the status quo or other reforms.

